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WISDOM AS INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE: AQUINAS, ODONIS AND BURIDAN 
 
Risto Saarinen 
 
In his Nicomachean Ethics (EN), Aristotle makes a distinction between intellectual 
and moral virtues. Intellectual virtues pertain to the perfection of the human mind. 
They are born and developed in us as a result of teaching. For this reason, they 
require time and experience (EN 1103a12-17). Aristotle mentions five intellectual 
virtues: prudence and art are related to practical life, but the three other intellectual 
virtues of science, understanding and wisdom deal with our reaching and holding the 
truth in theoretical matters (e.g. EN 1139b14-18). 
     The intellectual virtue of science (or scientific knowledge: epistêmê, scientia) is 
concerned with general and necessary things which can be employed in proofs and 
syllogistic reasoning. It is the soul's readiness to present syllogistic proofs in 
necessary matters (EN 1139b18-36). The starting-points and principles of this 
reasoning, however, must be understood intuitively and inductively. Therefore we 
need another intellectual virtue, that of understanding (or intuitive insight: nous, 
intellectus) in order to grasp the principles from which all reasoning starts. The virtue 
of understanding is a readiness to conceive these principles (EN 1140b30-1141a8) 
      Moreover, wisdom (sophia, sapientia) is the best mode of knowledge. Aristotle 
describes wisdom as that scientific knowledge which is concerned with the highest 
things. Wisdom is science and understanding which has the most valuable things as 
its object.  Such wisdom is not concerned with some particular skill or expertise, but 
a wise person is so in the general and universal sense (EN 1141a8-1141b8). For 
Aristotle, wisdom does not seem to be qualitatively different from science and 
understanding, but it is a combination of the two with regard to the highest and most 
general things. Wisdom unifies the different expertises acquired through the activities 
of  science and understanding. 
    In Aristotle's Metaphysics (M), wisdom has a prominent position as the virtue of 
those persons who know about first principles and causes. "Wisdom is knowledge 
about certain causes and principles" (M 982a1-2). The "wise man knows all things ... 
although he has not knowledge of each of them individually". "Superior science is 
more of the nature of wisdom than the ancillary" (M 982a8-10, 16-17). Since God is a 
first principle, metaphysics and wisdom are the most divine science (M 983 a1-10). 
Metaphysics and wisdom are thus related to the eternal, universal and immovable; 
Aristotle even calls metaphysics theology (M 1026a15-30). 
    In the following I will not focus on Aristotle's Metaphysics but on the medieval 
reception history of Nicomachean Ethics. I will survey some features of the 
scholastic interpretation of the three intellectual virtues of science, understanding 
and wisdom. In particular, I will deal with the nature of wisdom as compilation of 
science and understanding. First I will look at Thomas Aquinas's definition of the 
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three virtues in Summa theologiae and then compare it with two later commentaries 
on Nicomachean Ethics,  namely those by Gerald Odonis and John Buridan.1 
     Even though our sources are ethical writings, we cannot ignore Metaphysics. 
The scholastic authors were well aware of Aristotle's view of wisdom as metaphysics 
and theology. In addition, they continued other classical, hellenistic, biblical and 
Augustinian traditions of interpreting the many-sided phenomenon of wisdom. 
 
    
Thomas Aquinas 
 
     Aquinas asks "whether there are just three habits of speculative intellect, 
namely wisdom, scientific knowledge and understanding".2 One counter-argument 
claims that wisdom is not a distinct habit but a mode of knowledge, another holds 
that scientific knowledge and understanding are one, and a third one says that 
opinions an also be called intellectual virtues. We will concentrate on the identity of 
wisdom as it is outlined in Thomas's answer.  
    In an Aristotelian manner, Thomas begins his response by stating that the 
speculative intellect can reach the truth in two ways: in the case of principles, the 
intellect perceives their truth immediately (percipitur statim). This first way is called 
understanding. Other truths must be achieved in the second way by means of 
reasoning and investigation that proceeds from principles. This task of demonstrating 
the conclusions from principles is the activity of scientific knowledge or "science". 
Thomas makes a distinction in this activity: it may either concern the last truths in 
some knowlable matter or the ultimate truths with respect to all human knowledge. 
The first group distinguishes science, whereas the second group identifies wisdom. 
In this second group, wisdom is concerned with the "highest causes" (altissimas 
causas) and with that which is "knowable first and chiefly in its nature". Thus wisdom 
can set all things in order with its perfect and universal judgment based on the first 
causes. In the framework of this distinction, one can have different habits of scientific 
knowledge, but only one wisdom. In spite of the distinction, Thomas can admit that 
wisdom is a kind of science (quaedam scientia).3 
    In Sententia libri Ethicorum Thomas holds, in keeping with Aristotle, that wisdom 
is both understanding and science. As an insight concerning the principles, it is 
understanding; as an ability which concludes from principles it is science.  Because 
wisdom is a virtue that deals with all branches of scientific knowledge (virtus omnium 
scientiarum), it is more eminent than common knowledge. For this reason, wisdom is 
                                                     
1 For the relationships among the three authors, see Walsh 1975 and Saarinen 
2003. 
2 Summa theologiae I/II q57 a2. 
3 Summa theologiae I/II q57 a2, resp., ad1. For the translation of scientia as science, 
see Stump 2003, 549. 
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distinct from common knowledge.4 
    Thomas's philosophical definition of the intellectual virtue of wisdom is not very 
elaborated. To a great extent, it simply follows Aristotle. In commenting upon the 
Aristotelian notion of wisdom Thomas does not make use of a wider theological view 
of wisdom. In Summa theologiae, this brief discussion on science and wisdom is 
nevertheless embedded into a broader theological context. The seven gifts of the 
Holy Spirit (Isa 11:2-3) include understanding, knowledge and wisdom. Aristotle's 
intellectual virtues thus have a theological counterpart. If science is considered as 
being a virtue, then we have learned and acquired it, but if it is considered as being a 
gift, we simply have received it without any virtuous elaboration on our part. In 
theology, gifts are normally considered to be higher and qualitatively better realities 
than virtues, since gifts have their origin in God as giver.5 
    The distinction between virtues and gifts is philosophically challenging, because 
it is not obvious in what sense intellectual capacities can be acquired as virtues. 
Repeated exercise and will-power are normally needed for the production of a virtue. 
How can we learn intuitive understanding or wisdom through such exercise? One is 
tempted to think that intellectual brightness is simply there as gift or talent. Without 
going deeper into this complicated matter, it should be kept in mind that, for Aquinas, 
human will plays a role even in the emergence of intellectual virtues. On the other 
hand, it is also clear that intellectual virtues are in many ways very different from 
actual moral virtues which are the main subject of ethics.6 
 
Gerald Odonis 
We have seen that the philosophical definition of wisdom in Aristotle and Thomas 
Aquinas does not manage to distinguish this highest intellectual virtue very clearly 
from understanding and science. Later scholastics struggled with the same problem. 
The first Franciscan commentator of Nicomachean Ethics, Gerald Odonis, asks 
"whether wisdom is simultaneously science and understanding".7 
     Arguments against this opinion proceed from obvious conceptual problems. 
Two distinct virtues cannot be simultaneously called a third virtue. We may say that 
the first part of wisdom is understanding and the second part science, but, given this, 
they cannot be simultaneously one wisdom. We may also say that wisdom is for the 
most part understanding or for the most part science, or that there are many different 
kinds of wisdom, but not that one and only wisdom is both science and 
understanding at the same time.8 
                                                     
4 Sententia libri Ethicorum, lb6 lc5 n9. 
5 Stump 2003, 350-51. 
6 See Stump 2003, 339-350 and Reichberg 2002. 
7 Odonis 1500, 129 vb (lib. VI q12): "Utrum simul sit [sapientia] scientia et 
intellectus". 
8 Odonis 1500, 129vb-130ra. 
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    In defending Aristotle's view, i.e. that wisdom nevertheless proceeds from the 
two other intellectual virtues, Odonis undertakes several qualifications. He first 
compares the "doctrine of wisdom" (doctrina sapientialis) with the doctrinal identity of 
logic and natural philosophy (doctrina logicalis, naturalis).9 Wisdom and logic are 
distinguished from other doctrines with regard to the generality of their subject 
matter. Because of this generality, wisdom and logic can question their own 
axiomatic principles, whereas other sciences cannot. Other sciences concentrate on 
making proofs which proceed from the enunciated axioms, but logic and wisdom 
both enunciate their principles and make proofs. The strategy of making proofs with 
regard to the principles consists in showing that the negation of the enunciated 
principles is false, as Aristotle remarks e.g. in Metaphysics IV, 4. In this sense 
wisdom, like the logic of refutations, employs both the mode of intuitive 
understanding and the mode of scientific proof.10  
   Wisdom and natural philosophy, or physics, are connected with one another and 
distinguished from other branches of doctrine in their treatment of causality. Other 
sciences make proofs on the basis of causality (per causas), but they do not treat 
causes as such (de causis). Wisdom and natural philosophy discuss causes as one 
subject matter of their doctrine. They employ causality in making proofs, but, in 
addition to this general procedure of science, they have a different relationship to the 
very phenomenon of causality. Other sciences "accept" causality as their point of 
departure, but wisdom and natural philosopy can also conclude that there is such a 
thing as causality. Thus their  acceptance of causality as conclusion differs from its 
presupposition as principle.11 In this remark we thus see how wisdom employs both 
understanding and science. 
    The connection of wisdom and logic concerns the order of knowledge, whereas 
the connection between wisdom and natural philosophy deals with the order of 
being. Therefore, the nature of wisdom as indivisible unity of understanding and 
science is twofold. It first has to do with the phenomenon of both enunciating and 
making proofs in matters that are most general. In this activity wisdom is comparable 
to logic. Second, it is related to the phenomenon of both understanding what 
causality is and employing causality in making proofs. In this activity wisdom can be 
                                                     
9 Odonis 1500, 130 va. "Doctrina sapientialis" is probably synonymous with 
metaphysics. "Doctrina naturalis" is sometimes referred to as "phisica". 
10 Odonis 1500, 130ra: "Sciendum ergo quod doctrina logicalis et doctrina 
sapientialis conveniunt ad invicem et differunt ab aliis doctrinis in generalitate ut 
habetur 4. metaphisice. ... Ipse namque possunt arguere contra negantes principia, 
non tamen alie doctrine ut habet 1. phisicorum et 4. metaphisice. Ideo alie se habent 
ad sua principia enunciative et non probative ... Iste tamen due sua principia probant 
et enunciant. Et ideo intellectus harum doctrinarum inducit modum scientie per eo 
quod ad ipsum inducunt probationes." Cf.  Metaph. 1106a12-13. 
11 Odonis 1500, 130 ra. 
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compared to natural philosophy.12 
    In addition, both logic and natural philosophy lack something that proper wisdom 
as unity of understanding and science possesses. Logic does not treat the aetiology 
of causes (redditiva causarum); physics does not treat the first causes as such. 
Logic thus lacks the treatment of causes and physics the treatment of first principles. 
For these reasons, we need a distinct habit of wisdom which is similar to these two 
other branches of knowledge but not identical with either of them.13 
    We see that Odonis's discussion of the identity of Aristotelian wisdom is more 
elaborated and systematic than Thomas's. At the same time, its basic elements 
remain similar to Aquinas. As in Thomas, wisdom is concerned with the highest 
causes and first principles. Through a longer comparison with logic and physics, 
however, Odonis organises the discussion of Thomas and Aristotle in a more 
systematic fashion. He formulates an opinion according to which the identity of 
wisdom consists of several partial identities which together yield a new identity. 
Some very general branches of knowledge, that is, logic and physics, are concerned 
with both understanding and science. Wisdom is similar to both logic and physics, 
but not identical with either of them. Therefore, we must establish a new branch of 
knowledge, doctrina sapientialis, or metaphysics. 
 
John Buridan 
 
    In a brief paper, it is not possible to trace all different sources which later 
scholastics employ in their discussion of wisdom.14 I will only show how the 
discussion begun by Aristotle and Thomas acquires a more systematic elaboration in 
some 14th-century commentaries on Nicomachean Ethics. At the same time, it is  
important to see how the focus of the discussion remains relatively unchanged. After 
Thomas, the problems become more elaborated, but they nevertheless remain the 
same problems. John Buridan's influential Quaestiones super decem libros 
Ethicorum is a paradigmatic example of the dynamics of both innovative enrichment 
and remaining coherence. 
    John Buridan asks the same question as Odonis, namely "whether wisdom is 
                                                     
12 Odonis 1500, 130 ra, tertio, quarto. 
13 Odonis 1500, 130 ra: "Quinto sciendum est quod logica quamvis probet sua 
principia non immo dicitur intellectus et scientia eque proprie sicut sapientia que non 
est de causis ut redditiva causarum. Phisica vero quamvis sit de causis et sit 
redditiva causarum non tamen est de primis causis simpliciter nec redditiva 
primarum causarum simpliciter. Et immo quia doctrine logicali deficit causarum 
consideratio et doctrine naturali causarum primarum et versabilium principiorum 
consideratio. Immo nec ista nec illa dicuntur sapientia nec aliquis unus habitus qui 
proprie sit intellectus et scientia eo modo quo competit sapientie". 
14 For a general description of Odonis's and Buridan's view of virtue and ethics, see 
Kent 1995 and Zupko 2003, esp. 227-242. 
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understanding and science".15 Arguments against this claim are similar to those in 
Odonis's commentary. Buridan, however, does not give one definite answer to the 
question but concludes that one can distinguish wisdom from understanding and 
science in many ways.16 He outlines no less than three different ways to respond. In 
doing this, he repeatedly employs expressions like "some people say that". We may 
assume that all three ways were debated in Buridan's times and are in that sense his 
sources. 
     According to the first way, we may claim that in scientific demonstrations we 
need, in addition to understanding and science, a third notion. This third notion 
enables us to connect principles and conclusions in a proper way. We may prove 
that some conclusion is true, but in order to see that it is true because of the truth of 
the principles, we need wisdom.17  
      The third notion is thus an additional quality of scientific knowledge which 
enables us to grasp the causal relationship.  In addition to (1) the principles 
achieved through understanding and (2) the conclusions derived by virtue of science, 
systematic knowledge needs (3) an adequate grasp of underlying, systematic 
causalities. This grasp is called wisdom. Buridan employs the following example: It is 
one thing to know that the earth is situated between the sun and the moon; another 
thing to know that the moon is eclipsed; and a third thing to know how this eclipse is 
caused by the earth's position between sun and moon. This third notion is required 
for scientific knowledge in Posterior Analytics I,2 when Aristotle says that knowing a 
thing means that we know its proper causes.18 
    One may remark against the first way that, if this were generally the case, we 
would need wisdom in all scientific demonstrations. But Aristotle says both in Ethics 
(VI,7) and in Metaphysics (1,1) that wisdom pertains to the things that are highest by 
nature. To this objection Buridan replies that, according to Aristotle, we may speak 
about wisdom in particular fields of expertise. This is qualified and particular wisdom, 
whereas in metaphysics we deal with wisdom as such, as a proper intellectual 
virtue.19 Buridan grants, however, that at least in physics and  logic we may speak 
of distinct wisdom. Even then we can say that in metaphysics wisdom is more 
simpliciter because of its highest subject matter. This resembles the way we call 
                                                     
15 Buridan 1968, lib. VI, q 12, 127vb: "Utrum sapientia sit intellectus et scientia". 
16 Buridan 1968, 127 vb-128 ra, e.g. "Multi sunt modi distinguendi sapientiam ab 
intellectu et scientia."  These "modi" are also called "modi dicendi" or "ways" (via). 
17 Buridan 1968, 128 ra. 
18 Buridan 1968, 128 ra: "Et hec tercia notitia pertinet ad sapientiam. Licet enim he 
tres noticie concurrant in eadem demonstrationem, tamen formaliter distinguuntur. 
Aliud enim est cognoscere quod terra interposita est inter solem et lunam, et aliud 
quod luna eclipsatur, et aliud quod ipsa eclipsatur propter dictam terre 
interpositionem. Et illa tercia noticia notavit Aristoteles in diffinitione ipsius scire 
primo posteriorum quando dicit et quam illius est causa." Cf. Anal. post. 71b10-12. 
19 Buridan 1968, 128 ra-rb. 
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Paul an Apostle simpliciter, that is, without claiming that there would be no other 
apostles.20 
    The first way teaches that wisdom is not formally understanding and science, but 
rather "materially". In addition to these two notions, we need a third notion which 
provides our intellect with a sufficient idea of causality, thus organising scientifically 
the principles obtained through understanding and the conclusions derived through 
inference.21 
     Buridan here applies Aristotle's definition of scientific knowledge in Posterior 
Analytics 1,2. It is not enough to find accidental correlations between, for instance, 
the earth's particular positions and the eclipses of the moon. A scientist needs 
additional wisdom in order to grasp the underlying systematic causality between his 
points of departure on the one hand and his rational inferences on the other. With 
the "third notion" of wisdom the scientist can realize how the earth's shadow causes 
the moon to be eclipsed. Knowing a thing means that we know its cause or 
explanation. This capacity is ascribed to wisdom in Buridan's first way. 
    Buridan's second way defines wisdom as an acquired habit of the intellect. This 
habit is discussed in Aristotle's philosophical metaphysics.22 Metaphysics deals with 
the most general doctrines, that is, first principles, God and intelligences. Unlike 
other sciences, metaphysics and logic can question their own principles. One should 
not think that the phenomenon of questioning the principles aims at false sophistry. 
On the contrary, logic and wisdom can employ an "elenctic" inference, that is, a 
method by which one can falsify the contradictory opposite of a true principle and, 
consequently, affirm the true principle. As Aristotle shows in Sophistici elenchi, this 
mode of inference is not sophistry, but a method of discovering and eliminating false 
principles.23 
    Like wisdom, metaphysics is characterized by a twofold attitude to the principles. 
On the one hand, wisdom acts like understanding, that is, it does not seek proofs but 
has an immediate inclination to the truth as such. On the other hand, wisdom acts 
like science in employing the elenctic method through which it can identify the true 
principles.24 We see that the second way resembles Odonis's discussion insofar as 
                                                     
20 Buridan 1968, 128 rb. 
21 Buridan 1968, 128 rb: "Diceretur igitur quod sapientia non est formaliter intellectus 
et scientia, sed quasi materialiter et suppositive quia non secundum noticiam 
principii nec secundum noticiam conclusionis dicitur sapientia formaliter sed 
secundum noticiam terciam qua cognosco non solum hoc esse et illud sed hoc esse 
propter aliud". 
22 Buridan 1968,  128 rb: "Alio modo potest dici quod sola methaphysica dicitur 
sapientia si loquamur solum de habitibus intellectualibus nobis humanitus acquisitis 
prout de eis loquitur Aristoteles". 
23 Buridan 1968, 128 rb. Cf. Metaph. 1106a12-13 and Sophistici elenchi 165a1-5.  
24 Buridan 1968, 128 rb: "Ex quibus apparet quod methaphysica dupliciter habet ad 
huiusmodi principia. Uno modo per modum intellectus in quantum concedit ea sine 
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the comparison with elenctic logic is made, but Buridan here enriches Odonis's 
logical remarks. 
    The third way of defining wisdom proceeds from the observation that Aristotle 
does not restrict his discussion to the principles of various disciplines, but wants to 
include the first principle of being, God, as well.25 Wisdom, therefore, deals with the 
most difficult and admirable of divine things. Many have said that we can only 
ascend to the higher and separate substances through the knowledge received by 
our senses. On the other hand, since the separate substances are very different 
from our perceptions, we need something else in addition to them. This something is 
provided by the "natural light" of intellectus, which is capable of providing us with a 
better "notion" of separate substances than sense-perception alone.26  
    In this way Aristotle's metaphysics, or wisdom, is characterized by a twofold 
approach towards separate substances, or God. Science, on the one hand, relies on 
the evidence of sense-perception and makes its inferences on the basis of such 
evidence. Understanding, on the other hand, employs a non-perceptive light which 
endows it with a possibility to grasp the nature of these substances. In this sense, 
too, wisdom appears as both understanding and science when it is related to the first 
principle of being.27 
    Buridan finally remarks that the three ways do not exclude each other. In his 
brief responses to the counter-arguments he concludes again that wisdom is not 
formally understanding or science, but only materially.28 Following the third way, one 
may say that wisdom is a habit relating to those principles which are neither 
immediately at our disposal (understanding) nor indirectly knowable through 
mediating  inferences (science). The habit of wisdom employs both the mode of 
immediate intuition, or understanding, and the mode of scientific knowledge through 
inference in order to grasp these principles. In this sense wisdom is both 
understanding and science.29 
                                                                                                                                                                     
probatione ex sola naturali inclinatione intellectus ad ipsum verum. Aliomodo per 
modum scientie in quantum habet viam ad arguendum de ipsis elenchice contra 
negantes ea. Ideo sapientia simul dicitur intellectus et scientia". 
25 Buridan 1968, 128 rb-va: "Nam Aristoteles non solum vult quod sapientia sit 
intellectus et scientia circa prima doctrine principia, sed etiam circa prima principia 
essendi que sunt deus et intelligentie". Cf. Metaph. 983a1-10. 
26 Buridan 1968, 128 va.  
27 Buridan 1968, 128 va: "Dicunt igitur isti quod methaphysica que secundum 
Aristotelis vocatur sapientia inquantum versatur circa substantias separatas habet se 
ad huiusmodi substantias primo per modum scientie inquantum non potest nisi per 
sensibilia venire in noticiam illarum. Secundo per modum intellectus inquantum ultra 
sensibilium exigentiam virtutem proprii luminis sapit naturas earum". 
28 Buridan 1968, 128 va. 
29 Buridan 1968, 128 va: "Vel dicendum est secundum terciam viam modo consimili 
scilicet quod sapientia non est formaliter intellectus neque scientia, sed est habitus 
circa talia que nec ex se tamen notificabilia sunt nobis, nec tamen virtute mediorum 
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Concluding Remarks 
 
     The various interconnections among Aristotle's theory of science, ethics and 
metaphysics are essential for Buridan. His discussion of wisdom in Quaestiones 
super decem libros Ethicorum, Book VI, q12, is concerned with the understanding of 
wisdom as a virtue which is essential for both scientific knowledge and metaphysics. 
The former concern is prominent in his discussion of the "first way", the latter in his 
description of the "second" and "third" way. In spite of this integrative effort, 
Buridan's formal question remains the same as Odonis's, namely: how can we say 
that wisdom is both understanding and science? This question does not stem from 
Aristotle's Metaphysics nor from Posterior Analytics; but from the Nicomachean 
Ethics. 
    It is evident that Odonis employs Aquinas and that Buridan employs both 
Aquinas and Odonis. On the other hand, all three authors are remarkably 
independent from their predecessors. We must keep in mind that Buridan explicitly 
says that he is exposing various opinions of his colleagues. But even so, we can see 
how a creative enrichment and systematization takes place during the elaboration of 
this one issue. For these reasons, one cannot just conclude that a later author is 
"dependant" on some earlier author. The nature of dependance must be more 
carefully studied before anything more can be said concerning the actual doctrinal 
position of a given author. 
    Given that wisdom is an extremely rich philosophical and theological topic which 
has occupied Western thinkers belonging to various traditions, it is remarkable that 
Aquinas, Odonis and Buridan can all focus on Aristotle's specific view of wisdom as 
intellectual virtue. They do not bring in, for instance, the discussion about spiritual 
gifts and talents, but concentrate on the identity of this intellectual virtue in its 
relationship to understanding and science. Certainly, Aquinas speaks of theological 
wisdom elsewhere in his Summa theologiae, as we already remarked. Odonis 
mentions theological materials in his previous question.30 Even Buridan has some 
theological leanings in his postulate of natural light in the "third way". 
    In spite of these theological indications, wisdom is, in the texts analysed above, 
considered as a philosophical topic. The integration of this topic into the general 
Aristotelian framework gets the primary attention of all three scholastics. In this 
integrative work theology does not disappear completely, but it keeps a low profile. 
Maybe this phenomenon is essential for genuine philosophical work. One need not 
abandon theology completely, but one should, while working as philosopher, mention 
                                                                                                                                                                     
per que oportet nos duci in noticiam ipsorum, sed secundum utrumque modum simul 
propter quod simul participat modum seu virtutem intellectus et scientie". 
30 Odonis 1500, 129 va-vb (VI q 13): "Utrum sapientia sit intellectualis virtus." This 
question contains a list of theological sentences, e.g. "per sapientiam homo fiat 
contemptor mundi" and "per sapientia sapiens fiat amicus dei" (both 129 vb). 
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theological topics only in passing. 
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